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I. Global financial instability and the vulnerability of 
developing countries 
The issue I will address is of concern not only to Central 
Bankers or businessmen in the financial and industrial community, but 
also to ordinary people in the street: how to manage financial instability 
and shocks in a developing country so as to prevent virulent crises that 
can hit, as we have seen here in East Asia, even countries with a 
record of good governance and policy discipline, and push many people 
, to the brink of poverty. 
This is a daunting task for a number of reasons. First, instability 
is an inherent feature of international financial markets; it is global and 
systemic. But the international community has so far been unable to 
establish effective institutions and mechanisms at the global level to 
reduce the likelihood of such crises and better manage them when they 
occur. Rather, the ball has been put in the court of developing countries 
to take care of themselves. Second, developing countries are much 
more vulnerable to external financial disruptions, while their ability to 
respond is limited for a number of structural reasons. 
Financial instability is characterised not only by short-term 
vol tlllty In xch nge rat s and asset prices, but also by boom-bust 
cycl s which r often mirrored in sharp swings in the level of economic 
ctlvlty nd llvln condit on . In curr ncy markets the major problem is 
not d lly or w kly volatility of exchange rates, but sharp swings 
( yr tlon ) wh rein currencies are moved from one level to another by 
r plcJ turn round In c pit I flow . hi is also true for asset markets 
wh r bubbl r follow d by asset-price deflation. In a typical boom, 
tock prlc rl to I v I not ju tlfi d by the Ion -t rm earning capacity 
of fir . In th prop rty m rk t, pr c booms are usually associated 
with ov rproductlon, wh ch nd up In br aks and lut. Capital market 
boo c n I o ccomp nl d by xc s Ive investment in certain 
lndu trl , uch Inform at on nd communication t chnology, as een 
during th 1990 in t A In, anc durln the dot.com bubble In the 










United States. Credit market cycles are usually associated with boom- 
bust cycles in property and equity prices. Rapid expansion in bank 
lending is more often than not followed by increased defaults and non- 
performing loans, and even difficulties in meeting the demand of 
depositors. 
In a world of unstable capital flows driven by herd behaviour, 
every country, whether developed or developing, with an open capital 
account is vulnerable to sharp and unexpected swings in the external 
value of its currency. However, currency instability in industrial 
countries rarely spills over to domestic capital and credit markets. 
During the 1992-1993 EMS crisis sharp drops in lira and pound sterling 
did not provoke serious difficulties in the financial markets of the 
countries affected. Again recent years have seen sharp movements in 
the dollar vis-a-vis other major currencies without generating 
destabilizing spillovers to domestic financial markets. For instance, at 
the end of the 1990s the dollar-yen rate was seen to change by over 20 
per cent within a matter of a week. Such swings are comparable to 
those experienced in East Asia in 1997-98, but they did not lead to 
widespread defaults and bankruptcies. This is also true for the more 
recent boom-bust cycle of the dollar. 
By contrast, in developing countries domestic financial cycles 
are often associated with sharp swings in external capital flows and 
exchange rates. It is very rare that currency crises in developing 
countries are contained without having a significant impact on domestic 
financial conditions, economic activity and living standards. 
The greater susceptibility of domestic financial conditions in 
developing countries to currency instability is due primarily to the 
existence of large stocks of public and private debt denominated in 
foreign currencies; i.e. the so-called llablllty dollarlzatlon. Thi I th 
main difference between developing and industrial countries, nd the 
reason why currency crises in emerging m rk t plll ov r to dam tic 
financial markets. 
Liability dollarization is not a problem If ( ) doll r d bt I 
concentrated in sectors with foreign exchange earning cap city, uch 
as export industries; and (b) if maturities are long. Und r th 
conditions debtors are, in effect, fully hedged; they do not suff r from 
currency or maturity mismatches between their assets and II bllltl . 
But if maturities are short, sharp devaluations can ere t llquldlty 









last-resort to provide international liquidity, and this can easily lead to 
defaults and insolvencies. If, on the other hand, liability dollarization is 
widespread in sectors with little foreign exchange earning capacity, 
currency declines can create problems of insolvency, and the impact 
will be immediate when maturities are short. 
By the same token, currency appreciations generated by surges 
in capital inflows would add to booms in domestic asset and credit 
markets by creating windfall gains for dollar debtors, encouraging 
spending and borrowing, thereby aggravating financial fragility. Since in 
most developing countries liability dollarization pervades many sectors 
of the economy and maturities are often short, preventing boom-bust 
cycles in capital flows and exchange rates is essential for monetary and 
financial stability. In particular, unsustainable surges in capital flows 
and currency appreciations would need to be checked If costly financial 
crises are to be avoided. This in turn requires consistency between the 
exchange rate and capital account regimes, as well as a judicious 
combination of countercyclical monetary and regulatory policies. 
II. The debate on the exchange rate regime 
Exchange rate regimes in emerging markets have attracted 
considerable attention in the debate on factors contributing to currency 
and financial crises in recent years. Adjustable pegs (or the so-called 
soft pegs) have come to be seen as a major cause of crises in 
emerging markets. Consequently, the mainstream advice has been 
either that these countries adopt a regime of floating exchange rates, or 
that they go for a hard-peg by locking into a reserve currency through 
currency boards or by simply adopting a reserve currency as their 
national currency. Since the breakdown of the Argentinian 
Conv rtiblllty Law, however, currency boards have fallen from grace, 
nd gr at r mphasis is now placed on floating. 
he recent debate on appropriate exchange rate regimes for 
m rgln markets has focussed primarily on problems faced by a 
c rt In group of d v loping countries, notably in Latin America. 
Common f aturos of these countnes include lack of credible 
m cro conomlc pollci ; b nco of monetary and fiscal discipline; a 
hi tory of rr pld nd p rslst nt Inflation, high levels of domestic and 
xt rnl I publlc d bt; chronic curr nt ccount d nclts: a high degree of 
d p nd nc on xt rn I c pita! flows; open capital account regimes; 









rates have been used to provide a credible anchor to combat inflation 
and to facilitate external borrowing to close fiscal and current account 
deficits. 
Clearly these are not the conditions that characterise the large 
majority of countries in East Asia with track records of successful 
development and macroeconomic discipline. These countries have 
sought exchange rate stability as a key ingredient of successful export- 
oriented development strategy, rather than a substitute for credible 
macroeconomic policies. Thus, the debate on the other side of the 
Ocean sheds little light on appropriate exchange rate regimes in this 
part of the world. 
The role of combination of adjustable pegs and free capital 
mobility in emerging market crises is well established. When inflation is 
high and productivity growth is slow, a nominal peg causes a real 
appreciation of the currency and a widening of the current account 
deficit. Higher inflation also leads to higher nominal interest rates, 
creating short-term arbitrage opportunities for international investors 
and lenders, as well as incentives for domestic firms to reduce their 
costs of finance by borrowing abroad. If external deficits and debt are 
allowed to mount, the currency risk will rise rapidly. The worsening 
fundamentals eventually give rise to expectations of a devaluation and 
a rapid exit of capital. Sooner or later, the exchange rate peg is 
abandoned, leading to a free fall which, together with the hike in interest 
rates, causes enormous dislocations in the economy. 
The problem is that none of these qifficulties would be avoided 
under free floating. Indeed, persistent misalignments and gyrations 
have been the dominant features of the freely floating exchange rates of 
major reserve currencies since the breakdown of the Bratton Woods 
system. Evidence suggests that cri s are as Ilk ly to occur und r 
floating as under adjustable pegs. Under free caplt I mobility, nomln I 
exchange rates fall to adjust to dlff r nc In lnfl tlon r t : I. . th 
purchasing pow r p rlty Is not pr s rv d. ut dju tm nt of Int r t 
rates to inflation is quite rapid. As r ult, curr ncl of hi h-lnf tlon 
countries tend to apprecl t ov r th short t rm. h r lnforc - 
rather than temper - capital inflows nd aggr v t th los of 
competitiveness caused by high Intl tlon. Although , ppr cl ton I o 
heighten currency risks, m rk t c n lgnor th m wh n th y r dr v n 
by herd behaviour. For Instance, If the curr ncl n t A I h 
been allowed to float in the early 1990s, wh n Inflow w r In xc of 










appreciations. Again, if Malaysia and China had been floating today 
under a regime of free capital flows, it is quite likely that they would both 
have been experiencing nominal appreciations against the dollar. 
If, on the other hand, floating is really successful in deterring 
arbitrage-seeking capital inflows by creating significant currency risks, it 
would be doing so by discouraging the holding of domestic currency 
assets and encouraging dollarization. In other words, floating can be 
detrimental to the development of domestic financial instruments and 
markets. Indeed, almost all industrial countries achieved financial 
deepening and development behind closed doors, under various 
regimes of fixed exchange rates. 
Another argument in favour of floating is that it would allow 
greater autonomy for monetary policy in pursuing domestic objectives of 
price stability and growth while leaving external adjustment to currency 
movements. Nevertheless, under widespread liability dollarization, the 
exchange rate becomes a more important variable affecting domestic 
monetary and financial conditions than the interest rate. A depreciation 
would not only have a positive effect on growth through improved 
competitiveness and exports, but also a negative effect due to the 
increased debt burden. If this negative balance-sheet effect dominates, 
currency depreciations will be recessionary. Similarly, during boom 
conditions appreciations could add to demand pressures despite their 
adverse effects on the trade balance. Thus, stabilizing domestic 
economic conditions may require stabilization of the currency; i.e., 
monetary policy cannot simply ignore the exchange rate. 
Certainly, currency adjustments may be needed in response to 
external shocks even in an economy with monetary and fiscal discipline 
nd price stability. The conventional theory suggests that because 
w ges and prices are not fully flexible downwards, this should best be 
don through nominal adjustment in the exchange rate. True, but this 
does not mean that floating would always secure orderly adjustments to 
external shocks. On the contrary, unsustainable capital flows attracted 
by hort-t rm profit opportunities can delay adjustment, keeping the 
curr ncy at misaligned levels for prolonged periods, and then leading to 
sh rp d clin s and overshooting in the opposite direction. This has 
b n th c for the dollar on many occasions in the past three 
d c d . It has lso been happening in some emerging market 









Clearly, most developing countries need a regime that combines 
stability with flexibility. Stability is needed to avoid destabilizing 
financial impulses from sharp changes in the external value of the 
currency as well as to provide a reliable anchor for traders. Such a 
regime should also allow considerable flexibility in responding to 
external shocks in an orderly way without sacrificing stability and 
growth. 
The problem is that no such regime exists under free mobility of 
capital. Even if monetary policy were fully geared towards the 
management of the exchange rate, it would face dilemmas as long as 
the capital account is fully open. Consequently, attention should be 
paid to the role that can be played by prudential and capital-account 
regulations in preventing build-up of financial fragility and unsustainable 
booms in capital flows, as well as in facilitating orderly exchange rate 
adjustments in response to external shocks. 
Given the high degree of regional integration in East Asia, the 
prospects of securing relatively stable exchange rates may be greatly 
enhanced by regional monetary cooperation. In this respect useful 
lessons can be drawn from the experience of Continental Europe over 
the past three decades. Europe has never had much appetite for 
floating among the currencies of the countries in the region. Its first 
response to the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 
1970s consisted of "snake" and "snake in the tunnel" arrangements that 
were designed to stabilize the intra-European exchange rates within 
relatively narrow bands in an environment of extreme volatility. This 
was followed by the creation of the EMS in 1979, and eventually by the 
introduction of the euro and the establishment of the EMU in 1999. This 
experience, which took some 30 years to pass from soft pegs to hard 
pegs, is worth examining in this region. 










extreme cases, as in Latin America, price stability has been bought at 
the expense of financial stability, through exchange-rate based 
stabilization programmes, relying on unstable capital flows. 
The coexistence of reduced price instability with increased 
financial instability has turned attention to whether monetary policy 
should pay attention to conditions in financial markets rather than 
focussing on price stability alone. This issue is by no means confined 
to emerging markets. It has been equally important in the debate over 
monetary policy in Japan and the United States where economic 
difficulties that followed the earlier boom in the late 1980s in Japan and 
the dot.com bubble in the United States in the 1990s are traced to the 
benign neglect of financial market conditions in the design of monetary 
policy. 
The current debate in industrial countries has focussed on the 
role of monetary policy in preventing unsustainable asset-price bubbles. 
One proposal is to abandon inflation-targeting altogether, and to 
promote financial stability as the prime objective of monetary policy. 
Another one is to set a broader range for tolerable inflation rates and 
allow monetary policy within that range to focus on financial stability. 
Finally, there are proposals to use other means, such as counter- 
cyclical prudential measures, to deal with financial bubbles. 
For the reasons already mentioned, in emerging markets 
avoiding boom-bust cycles in capital flows and attaining a reasonable 
degree of stability in exchange rates should be a central component of 
any policy strategy aiming at greater financial stability. However, in this 
respect monetary policy on its own is not very effective. The main 
difficulty arises in large part because monetary tightening needed to 
check asset price bubbles tend to attract short-term capital flows and 
appreciate the currency. On the other hand intervention in the foreign 
exchange market to stabilize the currency runs against a number of 
hurdles. 
If Intervention is not sterilized, domestic liquidity would expand, 
lea~lng to faster inflation and higher nominal interest rates. Thus, 
interv ntlon would need to be sterilized by issuing government or 
c ntral bank debt; this is indeed what is meant by counter-cyclical 
mon t ry policy. But, this could lead to higher domestic interest rates, 
ttr cling ven more arbitrage flows. Furthermore, since interest 
rn d on r serv is usually much lower than interest paid on public 










when interest rate differentials are wide and the surge in capital inflows 
is strong. 
There are less costly methods of sterilization such as raising 
non-interest-bearing reserve requirements of banks. This would also 
raise the cost of borrowing from banks, thereby checking domestic 
credit expansion. However, it could encourage firms to go to foreign 
creditors. Banks may also shift business to offshore centres and lend 
through their affiliates abroad, particularly in countries where foreign 
presence in the banking sector is important. 
These dilemmas arise largely because counter-cyclical 
monetary tightening and interest rate increases tend to attract arbitrage- 
seeking, fixed-income capital flows. But the impact is different when we 
move from the fixed-income market to the equity market. If capital flows 
are primarily in FOi or portfolio equity, monetary tightening will have 
counter-cyclical effects on capital inflows by lowering both current and 
discounted expected earnings of corporations. 
It therefore follows that a capital-account regime designed to 
reduce the sensitivity of fixed-income flows to interest rate changes 
would allow greater space and autonomy to monetary policy in dealing 
with boom-bust cycles in financial markets and capital flows. 
Various market-based regimes exist to achieve such an 
outcome, widely used by industrial countries in the past. In the 1960s 
the United States levied interest equalization tax on outflows attracted 
by high rates abroad while Switzerland imposed negative rates on 
foreign deposits in the early 1970s when money seeking security was 
pouring in after the breakdown of the Bretton Woods arrangements. 
The dilemmas faced by monetary policy are harder when the 
bust comes. In the absence of large reserves or an international 
lender-of-last-resort, currency cannot be stablllz d by man t ry policy. 
As seen in East Asia and elsewhere, pro-cyclic I hlk s in Int r st r t 
will only deepen the recession. Whil t xing Inflow m y work In 
eliminating arbitrage m rglns, th r I no counterp rt In downturn 
when capital is exiting because of perc ptlon of Iner d curr ncy 
and default risks- perceptions th t oft n prov to b IMulflll n . Und r 
such conditions, temporary exchange controls and t nd till m y b 











IV. Prudential and capital-account regulations 
A. Scope and limits of prudential regulations 
Given the constraints faced by monetary policy in managing 
financial instability and shocks, prudential and capital-account 
regulations could provide effective mechanisms in dealing with the 
problems at hand. This they can do in two ways. First, they can 
directly prevent excessive risk-taking and build-up of fragility at times of 
boom and avoid meltdown at times of bust. Second, they can widen the 
space for monetary policy in managing financial cycles. 
Weak credit evaluation and excessive risk-taking are often seen 
to be at the origin of financial crises in emerging markets. There is thus 
general agreement that regulatory reform is essential for strengthening 
the financial sector. Regulations should ensure the solvency of 
financial institutions by establishing adequate capital requirements, 
appropriate standards for risk assessment and diversification, and 
sufficient provisions for non-performing and questionable portfolios. 
They should also ensure adequate levels of liquidity for financial 
intermediaries to handle maturity mismatches between assets and 
liabilities, particularly in view of increased interrelation between 
solvency and liquidity problems. 
In recent years there has been widespread reform at the 
national level, accompanied by a proliferation of international initiatives, 
particularly in the Basie Committee on Banking Supervision, to raise 
standards for prudential regulations. Nevertheless, the continuing 
incidence of financial instability in industrial countries with state-of-the- 
art prudential regulation and supervision suggests that reform of the 
kind promoted in the BIS is unlikely to provide fail-safe protection in this 
area. The limits to the effectiveness of regulation and supervision have 
various sources: 
First, financial regulation is constantly struggling to keep up with 
financial innovation, and in this struggle it is not always successful. 
There is a danger that new practices in financial markets not adequately 
cov r d by the regulatory framework may prove a source of instability. 
Indeed it Is often remarked that regulators deal with the causes of the 
I t crl Is not the next one. 
S cond, prud ntial rules themselves can be a source of 









Basie Accord assigned low risk weights to interbank claims, 
encouraging short-term interbank lending. As we now know, such 
borrowing driven by interest-rate arbitrage was a major factor in 
excessive exposure to short-term bank debt in the East Asian crisis. 
Third, prudential regulations are quite powerless against 
macroeconomic shocks. No asset on a bank's balance sheet can be 
classified generically as good. So long as business cycles are features 
of the economic system, there will always be unforeseeable 
deteriorations in the status of many bank assets. During such cycles 
risks take time to build up and become widely evident. For a while the 
quality of loans can actually be enhanced by the very financing boom of 
which they are a part. Eventually, the excess capacity generated by the 
boom and the over-extended position of banks are likely to lead to a 
reversal, causing collapse of values of assets and collaterals. 
Finally, many of the traditional risk assessment methods and 
prudential rules may simply serve to amplify cyclicality. This is clearly 
the case for loan-loss provisions based on current rates of loan 
delinquency. At times of boom when asset prices and collateral values 
are rising, loan delinquency falls and risks are perceived to be low. 
These lead to inadequate provisioning and overexpansion of credit. 
When the down-turn comes, loan delinquency rises rapidly, and can 
lead to ·credit crunch. There are also concerns that the new Basie 
proposals for rating-based risk assessment could introduce a pro- 
cyclical bias in international lending to developing countries, since, as 
we all know, credit ratings tend to be highly pro-cyclical, going up with 
the markets during boom, collapsing rapidly when the trouble starts. 
B. Counter-cyclical use of prudential tools 
One way of dealing with these problems is to d sign prud ntl I 
regulations in such a way that they provide built-In t blllz rs th t 
automatically limit the cycllcallty of the fin ncl I y t m. orw rd- 
looking rules may b ppll d to c pit I r qulr m nt In ord r to 
introduce a degree of counter-cyclic llty. This would m n t bll hlng 
higher capital requirements t tlm s of fin ncl I boom , b d on 
estimation of long-term risks over th ntlr financl I cycl , not ju t on 
the actual risk at a particular phase of the cycl . 
The same principles c n lso b ppll d to provl lonln . In ct 
Spain has been using a forward-looking syst m wh r by not curr nt but 










estimated on the basis of long-run historical loss experience for each 
type of loan. 
Similarly, long-term valuation may be used for collaterals in 
mortgage lending in order to reduce the risks associated with ups and 
downs in property markets. This is practised in the EU where property 
valuation in mortgage lending reflects long-term trends in the market for 
real estate. 
It is also possible to make forward-looking discretionary changes 
in prudential requirements in order to smooth out financial cycles. The 
main problem here is whether policy-makers can correctly identify 
financial cycles and imbalances. In this respect past experience may 
not always be a reliable guide to future difficulties, since booms can be 
driven by different dynamics in different cycles. However, this is a 
general problem encountered in establishing effective prudential 
regulations of any kind, not just in forward- looking mechanisms. 
C. Reducing currency risks 
While very useful in containing the damage that may be inflicted 
by financial crises, none of these measures could adequately deal with 
risks associated with sharp swings in capital flows and exchange rates. 
Such risks can be restricted in a number of ways by more stringent 
application of prudential rules to positions and transactions entailing 
currency risks. 
First, a distinction can be made between domestic currency and 
foreign currency liabilities of banks in applying measures such as 
capital adequacy provisioning, and liquidity and reserve requirements, 
using more stringent provisions for foreign exc ange liabilities. 
Second, restrictions may be imposed on currency mismatches in 
th b nklng system. These can be formulated as quantitative limits on 
open forex positions or penalties in the form of higher reserve 
r qulrements. Indeed, in most developing countries outright prohibition 
of curr ncy mismatches may be the best way to deal with the problem. 
h rdly, liminating currency mismatches do not necessarily 
mov r sks for banks but can translate currency risks into credit risks- 
th t I , it Imply m grat s risks. This would be the case when banks 
I n n for ign currencies to s ctors without foreign exchange earning 










property and infrastructure, and in Latin America and Turkey for private 
consumption. Such practices could be discouraged by applying higher 
risk weights and more stringent standards of provision, or prohibited 
altogether. 
Fourth, while one of the main functions of the financial 
institutions is to provide maturity transformation between ultimate 
lenders and borrowers, such a function cannot be automatically 
extended to international lending and borrowing. Therefore it is 
important to restrict maturity mismatches between forex assets and 
liabilities in the banking system. 
D. Capital-account regulations 
While prudential regulations can act, in certain instances, as 
adequate substitutes for capital-account regulations, they may not be 
able to prevent excessive risk-taking in cross-border borrowing and 
investment. Thus, more direct capital-account measures may be 
needed in order to reduce vulnerability to swings in capital flows and 
exchange rates. These can also be used in a forward-looking manner, 
tightened or eased according to the underlying conditions. 
There are a number of techniques available, with different 
degrees of restrictiveness and effects, widely used in industrial 
countries in the 1960s and 1970s. These measures differentiate among 
different sources and types of capital such as loans, portfolio and equity 
flows; among different maturities; different domestic uses; different 









While equity flows do not present serious dilemmas for counter- 
cyclical monetary policy, they may still be problematic. In countries 
where there are no restrictions on borrowing by transnational 
corporations in domestic markets and the capital account is fully open, 
FOi can be as volatile as other categories of capital flows. While bricks 
and mortar do not move, direct investors can borrow in order to export 
their capital. 
Portfolio equity flows, like FOi, are seen less problematic since 
the currency risk is borne by foreign investors. However, such inflows 
can establish strong destabilizing linkages between stock and currency 
markets whereby loss of confidence in one can create rapid exit in the 
other. Even though in such cases non-resident investors will be hurt by 
both declines in stock prices and the currency, this would not be 
enough to stop panics and prevent rapid exit. 
There have been only a few attempts in recent years to slow 
down unsustainable capital inflows into developing countries. Of these, 
perhaps the best known case is the un-remunerated reserve 
requirements used in Chile and Colombia in a counter-cyclical manner; 
imposed at times of strong inflows in the 1990s and phased out when 
capital dried up at the end of the decade. This was a price-based, non- 
discriminative measure, applied to all loans. It effectively taxed 
arbitrage inflows with the implicit tax rate varying inversely with 
maturities. Evidence suggests that these measures were effective in 
improving the maturity profile of external borrowing but not in checking 
aggregate capital inflows. In other words, they were effective in 
reducing financial fragility in the event of a currency crisis, but not in 
improving macroeconomic policy space. 
By contrast, direct measures appear to be more effective in 
allowing greater space for macroeconomic policy. One such 
experiment was in Malaysia during 1994 when a number of restrictions 
w r imposed on the acquisition of securities by non-residents which 
lasted for a period of one year. Empirical research suggests that these 
restrictions were more effective than Chilean reserve requirements in 
Improving external debt profile and preventing asset-price bubbles. 
Ag in China and India have been successful in using traditional 
xchange controls and capital-account measures in preventing 
in t bility whll continuing to receive large amounts of foreign capital, 










In closing I would like to emphasize five points. First, rules and 
regulations should be designe~ to ~!den the space. for growth- and 
stability-oriented macroeconomic policies, not to sustain unsound fiscal 
and monetary postures or unviable exchange rates, as was often the 
case in the 1960s and 1970s in both developing and industrial 
countries. Historical experience clearly shows that capital controls are 
no answer when the underlying policies are not sustainable. But it also 
shows that sound policies do not assure stability in capital flows. 
Second, there is a need to avoid sharp swings in capital account 
regimes, introducing ad hoc restrictions at times of crisis and having a 
hands-off approach when money is flooding in. It is more effective to 
have a permanent system of control, with instruments being adjusted 
according to cyclical conditions. 
Third, it should also be kept in mind that regulations entail costs. 
They can increase intermediation margins, impede the development of 
the financial sector and hinder entrepreneur spirit. These aspects of 
regulations should be taken into account in designing prudential and 
capital-account regimes. 
Fourth, while there are a number of general principles that can 
guide regulatory regimes in developing countries, there is no one-size- 
fits-all solution. As noted, appropriate content and mix of policies, and 
capital account and exchange rate regimes depend on the institutional 
capacities and structural characteristics of the countries concerned. 
Institutions may need to be strengthened or created before new policies 
and regulatory measures are introduced, but this is often a slow 
process. 
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